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COMMENTS
RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LAND OWNERS AS AGAINST
ARTIFICIAL RAIN MAKERS
Recent reports from the Southwest indicate that landowners in
that area have realized millions of dollars worth of agricultural
benefits from an intensive program of artificial rainmaking. From
an economic point of view this might indicate a new era of great
prosperity, but the question immediately presents itself, are those
private individuals who are engaged in this "rainmaking" program
depriving their neighbors of their normal rainfall, and if so, what
rights do these neighbors have? If, of course, science progresses to
the point where it can generate artificially more rain than that
produced naturally, and leave unchanged the normal precipitation
in surrounding areas, then it would seem there is no problem since
no one is damaged. But the problem considered in this article is
limited to the present phase of the art of rainmaking where it appears that in order to produce artificially more rainfall on one
man's land it is necessary to reduce the rainfall on someone else's
land; more specifically, if the owner of Blackacre, by seeding the
clouds passing over his land, reduces the amount of rain which
would normally fall on Whiteacre, what right in the owner of
Whiteacre, if any, has been violated by such activity?
I
The first problem presented is whether or not a landowner has
any rights in the clouds passing over his land, and the resulting
natural rainfall. This question, although a somewhat novel in the
field of law, requires for its understanding, a consideration of the
basic principles of property law.
Although the terms "ownership" and "property" have been the
subjects of varying definitions beginning from the time when the
law first recognized the reducing of an object out of the common
mass to private control, it is generally recognized today that any
definition of property must include the idea that property is not the
object itself, but rather the rights a person has in such object.'
The same idea is perhaps better contained in the concept of ownership:
to be legal con"The essence of ownership is generally held
2
trol over a thing in all its connections."
Some writers have popularly referred to ownership as the "bundle
'3
of rights which a person has in a thing."
'Thompson,
Real Property, §40 ( Penn. ed. 1939).
2
Supra, note 1.
8Brown, Personal Property, §5 (1936).
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Ownership, then, consists of rights or interests in a thing. These
rights which a person has as an owner can be catagorically summarized as: first, the right of exclusive possession; second, the
right of use; third, the right of disposition. These rights are universally recognized by all leading authorities.' Furthermore these
rights are not only essential to ownership, but are considered property interests in themselves, and within the protection of the Constitution5
,One court in considering the right of a city to deprive a landowner of the use of his property without compensation, said that
of the rights a person has in an object, the most essential and
beneficial right is his right to use. It is only natural that the right
of use should be the most essential attribute of property for without the right of use the owner would have nothing but barren
legal title. The courts have recognized the value of this right,
and in order to insure its proper exercise have developed certain
additional rights which a person has naturally as a landowner to
secure in full this right of use. These complementary rights can
be summarized briefly as: one, riparian rights; two, right to support, both lateral and subjacent; three, right to natural diffusion
of air; and four, right to natural drainage.
It is apparent that the reason these complementary rights were
developed was to secure to the landowner the use of his land in its
natural state, without interference by his neighbors. A closer examination of the nature of these rights reveals that they relate generally to the natural elements nature places on the surface, illustrating the fact that the law recognizes that ownership of land encompasses more than the mere right of occupancy. The right of
occupancy without the right of use is valueless. The right of use
without the right to use the land in its natural condition is even
more valueless under certain conditions.
Courts have held that the right to use land in its natural state
exists jurae naturae. For example the court in Indianapolis Water
Cgmpany v. American Strawboard Company in considering the
right of a riparian owner to have a stream flow by in its natural
state said:
"It has been well said that the rights of a riparian proprietor,
so far as they relate to any natural stream, exist jurae naturae, because his land has by nature the advantage of being
washed by the stream; and as the facts of nature constitute

'Boothby v. City of Westbrook, 138 Me. 117, 23A (2d) 316 (1941) ; Thompson,
supra, note 1, §41; 42 Am. Jur., Property, §2, 40 (1942).
Terrance v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15 (1923).
153 F. 970, 974 (1893).

'8City of St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861 (1893).
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the foundation of the right, the law should recognize and
follow the course of nature in every part of the same stream."
The court then went on to point out that it is not the ownership
of the bed of the river which is the basis of the right, but rather
the fact that due to the situation of the land the landowner receives natural benefits from the stream, and it is these benefits
which give the landowner the right to insist that the stream flow
as it is wont by nature to flow.
This principle that the court will protect the landowner in the
natural use of his land, and preserve to him the natural benefits
of his land, is borne out by the cases involving the right to natural
support, to natural diffusion of air, to natural drainage, and to
riparian rights. 8
Following these basic principles of property law, the courts
might very easily conclude that natural precipitation is one of the
rights in that 'bundle of rights' which the court will protect as
essential to the use and enjoyment of one's own land. Such a holding would at least protect a landowner from the consequences of
his neighbor's unlimited rain-making experiments.
However, in the one reported case, 9 this theory does not seem
to be recognized, as is evidenced by the language of the court:
"Apart from the legal defects in plaintiff's suit (since they
clearly have no vested property rights in the clouds or the
moisture therein), the factual situation fails to demonstrate any
possible irreparable injury to plaintiff."
The opinion also states:
"Since plaintiffs have shown neither a factual nor legal basis
for the drastic relief they seek, the motion for a temporary
injunction is denied."
It is to be noted, however, that the problem involved in this case
was a threatened trespass action, and that the defendants represented the entire city of New York, suffering at that time from a
serious drought. Prescinding for a moment from the nature of the
action and the policy arguments involved, the court offers no substantial reason for its parenthetical statement that a property
owner has "no vested property rights in the clouds or the moisture
therein." Indeed it is not at all clear just what the court means
by its statement, for while it is true that a landowner has no vested
property right in the moisture or clouds while over another man's
land, it does not necessarily follow that he has no rights whatso8 3 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 714 (3rd ed. 1939).
9 Slutsky

v. City of New York, 97 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 238 (1950).
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ever to the natural benefits which will accrue to him from the
normal rainfall. This distinction can be found in the law governing
the rights of a riparian owner; while such an owner has no vested
property right in the water itself while it is passing over his neighbor's land, he does have a right to the benefits of that 'as it is wont
to flow." 0 Thus the Slutsky case, while making a rather categorical
statement regarding the rights of property owners in the clouds overhead, actually throws little light upon the problem involved.
Another more plausible argument based upon property concepts,
whereby one could justify his interference with the passage of
clouds over his land, would be to assert title to all the airspace
above his land, by virtue of his ownership of the underlying soil.
This theory is a literal application of the ancient maxim, "cujus
est solum est usque ad coelum," (loosely, he who owns the soil
also owns to the sky.) Ownership of the surrounding airspace would
thus give to the landowner ownership of the clouds resting upon
or in this "realty."
But a literal application of the ad coelum doctrine is not only
a perversion of the true meaning of the doctrine but is also in utter
disregard of precedent, and in direct conflict with present day decisions. Being phrased and conveyed in Latin, the maxim is popularly thought to have been a part of the Roman Law, although it
is commonly held among authorities today that it never was a part
of that law at all, but was the work of one Accursius, a commentator on Roman Law, who inserted it in the margin of his comments, using it in reference to the right of owners of burial plots
to have such land free from overhanging buildings. But even if it
were a part of the Roman Law, an examination of good Latin
reveals that in Latin the maxim does not mean what those seeking
its literal application contend it means. The maxim says that the
landowner owns up to the coelum, not that he owns the coelum, 'ad' in
Latin meaning 'to.' And further, as to the meaning of the word 'coelun'"
the District Court in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation,1 in
considering the rights of a landowner in airspace in connection with
an action for an injunction against a flying school, said:
"Apparently, therefore, according to good Latin usage, the
coelum was a space which began only a short distance above
the surface of the earth. One Latin scholar described it as
the space lying only a little above the highest tree tops and
building."
A knowledge of the true meaning of the maxim is valueless,
however, unless it is followed in that meaning by the courts, for
loInfra, note 118.
F. (2d) 929 (1930).
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a maxim is law only to the extent to which it has been applied in
adjudicated cases. Furthermore, the maxim should be taken from
the law, not the law from the maxim.
Recognizing these principles, Hackly, in an article entitled,
Trespassers in the Sky,1 2 examined the English decisions dealing
with maxim, attempting to find a basis therein to support claims
of ownership to unrestricted heights, and concluded:
"It hardly seems necessary to point out that none of them
(cases) may be properly regarded as authority for ownership
of space in the vicinity of the clouds."
"Apparently no one now seriously advocates a literal interpretation of Lord Coke's maxim. Even before the airplane
it was characterized by an English Court (Wandworth
Board of Water Works v. United Telephone Co., 13 Q.B.D.
904, 53 L.J. Q.B. 449) as a fanciful phrase which had never
had been the law at all."
In a companion analysis of American decisions, the author says:
"In regard to these decisions, two things stand out. First,
whenever the maxim has been construed or explained, it has
generally been regarded as a rule for the full enjoyment of
one's land, and not as a rule for the ownership of space as
such. Second, in no case has the actual decision been that
private ownership of space exists at such a high altitude
above the surface as that usually flown by airplanes, no
matter how broad and sweeping may have been the court's
language."
In as much as the claim of unbounded ownership of airspace is
unsupported in history or precedent, it remains to be seen whether
there is any support in present day decisions. With the advent of
the airplane came the first litigation involving assertions of ownership of airspace above very limited heights. The courts at this
time rejected the ad coelum doctrine first, as being unsound and
contrary to elementary legal principles of property, and second, as
not being an adequate answer to the social and economic needs of
the times.' 3
A literal application of the ad coelum maxim might find some basis
in the wording of the Uniform Aeronautics Act approved in 1922, section 3:
"Ownership of Space-The ownership of the space above the
lands and waters of this State is declared to be vested in
1221 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1932).

' 8 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation, 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. A. 6th, 1932),
modifying on appeal 41 F. (2d) 929 (1930). An even more vehement rejection
of the maxim is found in Hinman v. Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755, cert.

denied 57 S. Ct. 431 (1937).
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the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the
right of flight described in Section 4.'-4
But the Supreme Court of Georgia1 5 held that the flight of an aircraft over the land of another is not a trespass per se in spite of
the fact that there were present in the Georgia Civil Code certain
sections similar to this provision in that it declared that the rights
of an owner of land extend downward and upward indefinitely,
and which gave him a right of action for interference therewith.
The court said that the upper airspace which is beyond possible
possession by the occupant below is free territory. The court went
on to say:
"But even if the Code was intended to express the ad coelum
theory in its entirety, and this we assume in the present case,
it remains true that the maxim can have only such legal signification as it brings from the common law."
Since possession is the basis of all ownership, that which man
can never possess would seem to be incapable of being owned.
Following the literal interpretation of the maxim leads to a "reductio
ad absurdum" for a man would have property rights where no man
could exist. A landowner, therefore, under the ad coelum doctrine does
not ownt airspace to any height beyond that which he might possibly
possess or occupy.
A necessary adjunct to a claim of ownership of the clouds under the ad coelum doctrine is the consideration of the clouds as
being in the nature of realty. But the most necessary element of
the subject of a real property interest is that the subject of such
interest be capable by its nature of exclusive possession. It is
stretching the imagination to state that clouds as such are capable
of this exclusive possession. Clouds floating high above the earth,
of constantly changing form and mass, do not seem to be the type
of object one could say he possessed as such. Factual possession
of a cloud being impossible, the law should not recognizes a ficticious legal possession. The foregoing can best be summarized by
the simple phrase of Blackstone: "Human law must not contravene
human nature. '' 16
Thus far an attempt has been made to show that a landowner,
as such, does have a property right in the natural fall of rain, at
least so far as it goes to affect the use and enjoyment of his land.
The exact nature of this right, and its many ramifications, present
another, and perhaps more complicated problem. There are, how'1411 U.L.A. 160 (1938).
15 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta et al, 178 Ga.514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
' 8 .Cooley, Blackstone, 42.
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ever, certain analogous cases and principles which may be. of some
assistance in arriving at the correct answer.
Anglo-American Jurisprudence has long recognized that all adjoining riparian landowners, because of their position upon a flowing body of water, are able to claim certain rights in that water.
These rights have been classified as natural rights accruing to all
such owners. 17 The early law upon this subject seems to indicate
that a riparian owner, while possessing usufruct in the stream, had
no right whatsoever to diminish the quantity of water which would
naturally descend to his neighbor, since such diminution would deprive that neighbor of the right to have the water flow "as it is
wont to flow" (currere solebat). 1 As the law developed, however,
this doctrine was modified, until today riparian owners, while still
regulated by the rights of other such owners, possess what is called
the right of "reasonable use." 19
Considering the nature of clouds, their fleeting and effervescent
nature, it may be difficult to establish a physical analogy between
such clouds and a definite body of water, flowing across the surface
of the earth, in an exact channel. 20 Poetically, of course, it might
be said that clouds, travelling on prevailing Westerlies, are at least
somewhat in the nature of a flowing body of water, but it is quite
improbable that the courts will take cognizance of any such poetic
concepts.
A more forceful argument in the establishment of an analogy,
can be found, perhaps, in a comparison of the origin, operation and
effects of both clouds and streams. A stream, for example, is a
creation of nature. In its operation, it will naturally appropriate
itself; that is, a stream, without any assistance from mankind, will,
by its nature, seep into the surrounding soil. This natural seepage
will constitute a benefit (as opposed to a burden) to the adjoining
land. These same facts can be predicated of rain clouds. Such
clouds exist as a result of the forces of nature; they will naturally
precipitate themselves; and they are usually considered a benefit
to the underlying lands. Considering then, the origin, operation
and effects of clouds and streams, and their apparent similarity,
1"Tiffany, supra, note 8,§722; Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard
Co., supra, note 7.
18 3 Kent, Commentaries, 439 (12th ed. edited by 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 1873)
Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East. 208, 214 (1805).
19 Stratton v. Mt. Harmon Boys School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913) ; Weiss
v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co., 13 Ore. 496, 11 P. 255 (1886).
20 While most cases have required definite and distinct banks, it has been held
that where a stream flows in a continuous current, the fact that the water
thereof, because of the character of the land, spreads over a large area without apparent banks, does not affect its character as a water course. Miller &
Sux v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502 (1909).
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perhaps it could be said that just as the law will protect a riparian
owner from the unreasonable activities of his neighbor, so too
should it protect a landowner from at least the unreasonable rainmaking experiments of his fellow men.
Generically speaking, of course, it is easy to state that the law
should permit a reasonable interference, but should prohibit an
unreasonable interference, with the natural precipitation of rain
clouds. What is reasonable and what is unreasonable, is another
entirely different question.
In the case of streams, the courts, while usually speaking in
terms of 'all the circumstances,' have at least laid down several
qualifications of a reasonable use. A distinction is made between
the ordinary or natural uses, and the extraordinary or artificial
uses. 21 In the case of the former, a riparian owner has been allowed
to use all the water, regardless of the effect it might have upon
the lower proprietor, such use being considered reasonable as
necessary to sustain life itself.22 To determine the reasonableness
of extraordinary uses, the courts have considered all the circumstances involved, noting especially the amount of water taken, the
size of the stream, the effect upon other landowners, and the
necessities of the one making the consumption." In considering
the problem of the amount of water taken, the courts have again
restored to a generic phrase, 'material diminution.' 24 The existence
of waste has also been considered as affecting the reasonableness
25
or unreasonableness of a particular use.
It is almost self-evident that it would be absurd to try to apply
the above standards to the problem at hand. It may be possible
to determine the needs of the one artificially causing the rain, but
to determine the amount of rain taken in relation to the whole,
the effect had upon other landowners, and the amount of waste, if
any, involved, is almost a physical impossibility, at least in view
of present day scientific knowledge. 26 Under these circumstances,
if the stream analogy should be followed, there would appear to
be good reason for the courts, at this time, to follow also the early
Lone Tree Ditch Co. et al v. Cyclone Ditch Co. et al., 26 'S.D. 307, 128 N.W.
596 (1910).
22 Cf. Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super, 362, (1903) where the court held that a
stream could be drained entirely in order to supply the drinking, culinery and
cleaning water for nine-hundred patients in an insane asylum. This is perhaps
an exaggerated case of a natural or ordinary use.
21

Farnham, Water and Water Rights, 1578-9, §466 (1904).
Diminution of one-fifth was held excessive in Weiss v. Oregon Iron & Steel
Co., supra, note 19. Diminution of one-half was held excessive in Kimberly
2 & Clark Co. v. Hewit et al., 79 Wis. 334, 48 N.W. 373 (1891).
5 Meng v. Coffee et al., 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713, 718 (1903).
26 Some courts, however, in the case of percolating waters, have not been too
perturbed by similar problems. Infra, note 40.

232

24
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development of the law on that subject, and prohibit any interference whatsoever with the natural passage of rain clouds. But
even under some doctrine of reasonable use, a similar result could
be achieved. In view of the possible and unknown widespread effects
which any program of artificial rain-making might have upon an extended area, any interference could, with very little difficulty, be considered as unreasonable.
Of course, if we are to follow, our stream analogy in all parts
of the country, another problem will arise in the Western and
Southwestern States, where the doctrine of absolute appropriation
is in effect.2 7 Under this doctrine, which abrogates the idea that
riparian rights are natural rights, any riparian landowner may appropriate the water of an adjoining stream, regardless of the effect
such appropriation might have on a lower owner, provided the
appropriator does not waste any of the water, and provided that
there is no interference with a prior right of appropriation.2 Basically this is a theory of "first in time, first in right." It is interesting
to note, however, that with one exception, all states adhering to
the appropriation doctrine, have done so under some statutory or
constitutional provision.2 9 The one exception is the State of
Nevada, where a judicial recognition of appropriation was subsequently affirmed by statute. These statutory or constitutional
provisions declare that "all" or "certain" waters are "public
waters" belonging to the state, and are subject to appropriation in
that state.30
Since this doctrine has arisen as a result of the normally arid
condition of the states involved, it is difficult to foretell just what
course will be followed in the case of rain clouds. The imperative
necessity which gave birth to unlimited appropriation is still present, and if the 'public water' statutes can be construed to include
passing rain clouds (although it might be diffictilt to say that such
was the intent of the original legislatures who passed the law)
then there would seem to be no reason for prohibiting unlimited
rain making experiments. Probably, however, these states will be
the first to establish governmental regulation of such activities, on
the grounds that public necessity demands such action.
2

7Tiffaney, supra, note 8, sec. 738; Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152,
201 P. 702 (1921).
Kinny, Irrigation & Water Rights, 1054, (1912). Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch
Co.,
6 Color. 443 (1882).
2
9 Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, (1942).
30 Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Washington include
"all" waters; Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Texas and Wyoming include "natural water courses, natural streams and
natural channels."
281
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A second analogy which may be applied to this new field of
law is the application of the law of percolating waters as found
in the American decisions. It appears from an analysis of the law
on this subject that at an early date the American courts,.3 1 recognizing the fact that the underground waters were a natural benefit to the land and necessary for the use and improvement of the
soil, have expressed a dissatisfaction with the common law rule
of absolute appropriation based on the unqualified ownership of
the land extending from the surface down to the center of the
earth3 2 This common law rule, if carried to its logical conclusion,
would not give the landowner the absolute right to withdraw
all the percolating waters in the vicinity but would on the other
hand work a deprivation of the very right sought to be enforced.
Assume that X and Y are adjoining landowners. Under the "ad
coelum" doctrine referred to, X owns not only the surface land
of Blackacre but that portion immediately below it to the center
of the earth. But Y is in the identical position with regard to
Whiteacre. Because the percolating waters would be subject to
the same treatment in the eyes of the law as the soil, any withdrawal
of the waters under Whiteacre by the owner of Blackacre would be
a conversion by X. One solution to this situation might appear
to be the acceptance of a rule which would tolerate no interference with
the percolating water in any way. But this doctrine of non-action
would in effect be a deprivation of property; at least that element
referred to as the right to the reasonable use and enjoyment of
one's property. The solution to the dilemma seems to be the acceptance of the reasonable use rule. This is the course that the majority of the states have taken. 33
But even though the rule seems to be settled the controversy
has remained because of some court's interprtation of reasonableness. The position of the New York court in the case of Forbell v.
City of New York3 ' is. particularly confusing although it has been
cited by many courts. While granting a perpetual injunction
against the city of New York restraining it from operating a pump
on its lands, the effect of which was to lower the underground
water table thereby making the plaintiff's land unfit for agricultural
purposes, the court went on to say:
"It is not unreasonable ... that (the appropriator) should
31 Basset v. Salisbury Co., 43 N.H. 569, Am. Dec. 179 (1862).
82 Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees & W. 324, 152 En. Rep. 1223 (1843). (This case is
authority for the Common Law rule, wherein was announced the principle
which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath the surface. See also
55 A.L.R. 1390.).
33
Thompson, supra, note 1, §663.
Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644, 51 L.R.A. 695, 79 Am.
St. Rep. 666 (1900).
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dig wells and take therefrom all the water he needs in order
to get the fullest enjoyment and usefulness of his land, either
for purposes of pleasure, abode, productiveness of soil, trade,
manufacture, or for whatever else the land as land may
serve. He may consume it, but must not discharge it to the
injury of others. 35
This statement has been used to apply a rule the effect of which
is similar to that expressed in Acton v. Blundel,3 6 the only limitation
37
being that the appropriator must use all of the water he takes.
The New York court's statement in the Forbell38 case seems to
be inconsistent with the decision reached, at least insofar as the
result may be affected. That court held that one who merchandises
the water is not exercising reasonable use; while one owning a
factory on the land and using the percolating waters in the bottling
of soda water and selling the soda water would be exercising reasonable care even though he consume all the water. In both cases
the result is the same, i.e., the adjoining landowner is deprived
of percolating water.
In those cases in which there is an inadequate supply the better
rule is that the term "reasonable user" does not mean that one
person having correlative rights in a common supply of water may
take all that is reasonably beneficial to his land, regardless of the
needs of others, but only his reasonable share of the supply. 39
While some courts, with the aid of modern scientific equipment,
have overcome the problem of determining a reasonable share of
an apparently unknown quantity of subterranean water," the answer to that same problem in relation to clouds might present
a more serious obstacle. Under such circumstances, the courts,
rather than resort to an inequitable theory of absolute appropriation (which they seem to be rejecting), might very well follow a
theory of non-action, holding in abeyance the reasonable use rule
until science is able to determine, with some degree of accuracy, the
amount of water which can be found in a particular cloud formation.
The third analogy which may serve as a basis for a rule
applicable to rainfall is that of surface waters. While the physical
analogy between clouds and surface water may be difficult to establish, the only real basis of analogy should be the effect of the
35The court granted the injunction prayed for on the grounds that the City of
3

New York was merchandising the water and as a result was not using the
water for the enjoyment and usefulness of the land.

6Supra, note 32.

37 Hawthorn et al. v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N.Y. 326, 87 N.E. 504, 23

C.R.A. (N.S.) 436, 128 Am. St. Rep. 555 (1909).

33 Supra, note 34.

9 Echel v. Springfield Tunnel & Dev. Co., 87 Cal. App. 617, 262 P. 425 (1928).

40 Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J. 673, 74 A. 379 (1909).
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water on the land, i.e., whether it is a detriment or a benefit to
41
the land as land.
In the past both the Civil Law and the Common Enemy jurisdictions regarded surface waters as a burden or a detriment to
the land. Using this premise as a basis, the states invoking the
Civil Law rule attempted a solution by imposing an absolute rule
of non-action.'2 The application of the "sic utere" principle was
perhaps the more equitable solution when compared to the Common Enemy rule, the practical result in the former being that a
purchaser of land bought with notice of the existing terrain and
with notice that his land was required to accept the burden of
flowing surface waters from upper owners while having the benefit
of his land naturally discharging the surface water onto the land
below. The Common Enemy jurisdiction arrived at the opposite
result proceeding from the same premise, allowing a landowner to
rid his land of surface waters by preventing the surface waters
from coming upon his land,4 3 or by diverting the natural course
of such water,4 although he thereby causes injury to the adjoining
landowner receiving such water. In both cases there appears to
be an interference with an owner's use and enjoyment of his property.
Because of the premise (that surface water is a detriment to
the land), the courts applying either rule were driven to the position that the appropriation by an upper owner could never work
a hardship on the lower owner because the upper owner was ridding his neighbor of a burden. There thus arose the doctrine of
45
unlimited appropriation of surface waters.
In a situation involving rainfall, there is little doubt that the
rain should be considered beneficial to the land. At least in those
cases in which this factor is present the reason for the appropriation rule regarding surface waters should not be applied. It is an
41

The court in Bassett v. Salisbury Co., supra, note 30, applied this test in com-

paring natural streams and percolating waters. "The law regulating water
courses has its origin in the benefits and injuries that may arise from water.
These benefits may be quite similar in cases of underground and surface
drainage and of drainage of water courses ....
So far as there is a similarity
of benefits and injuries, there should be a similarity in the rules of law applied."

43 Miller v. Perkins, 204 Iowa 782, 216 N.W. 27 (1927).
4 Bowlesby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 354, 86 Am. Dec. 216 (1865).
44Jessup v. Bomford Bros. Silk Mfg. Co., 66 N.J.L. 641, 51 A. 147, 58 L.R.A.
329, 88 Am. St. Rep. 502 (1902).
' 5 Tiffany, supra, note 8, §744. The reason for this conclusion in the Common
Enemy jurisdictions is obvious. But under the strict interpretation of the Civil
Law, the dominant owner should not be allowed to appropriate the surface
water to the detriment of the lower owner. This view, however, is not adopted
even in those states where the Civil Law rule is applied in respect to the servitude on the lower owner.
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oft quoted maxim that "no law can survive the reasons on which
it is founded." 46
In addition to this there is a growing tendency in the states
to extend the doctrine of reasonable user to surface waters. This
doctrine is embodied in the principle that "the landowner's right to
obstruct or divert is limited to what is necessary in the reasonable
use of his own land. 47 This reasonable user rule differs from the
appropriation rule in that the former does not purport to lay
down any absolute rule with respect to surface waters, but leaves
the entire matter to be determined "upon all the facts and circumstances of the case."48 Other states purporting to hold the Common Enemy doctrine have engrafted the rule with exceptions which
in actual result produce decisions which could be reached under
the reasonable user rule. At least one state, in order to avoid the
Common Enemy rule has extended the definition of watercourses
to include sizeable and periodic bodies of water having no definite
bed or channel. 49 The Wisconsin court affirms this need for exceptions.50 The result is that the upper owner does not have an unqualified right in the appropriation of these waters.
If the analogy of surface waters should be used by the court to
apply a rule to the field of artificial rainmaking, it appears that
this field lies within the exceptions to the Common Enemy rule
(and the Civil Law rule as far as the doctrine of appropriation is
concerned). This conclusion is based upon the premise that the
rainwater is beneficial to the land. Once this is ascertained the
courts might very well hesitate to apply a rule of absolute appropriation, "The simple plan; that they should take who have the
power and they should keep who can." 51
The courts upon further consideration of the extraordinary
effects which might result from an intensive program of rainmaking may very reasonably conclude, as indicated earlier in this article, that any interference, by private individuals with the forces
of nature, would be unreasonable in view of the embryonic stage
52
in which the art of rainmaking exists at this time.
46 Katz v. Walkenshaw, 114 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663, 74 P. 766, 64 L.R.A. 236, 99 Am.

St Rep. 35 (1903).
- Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276 (1870).
" Ibid.
49
50 Hoefts v. Short, 114 Tex. 501, 273 S.W. 785, 40 A.L.R. 883 (1871).
Hoyt & another v. City of Hudson, 27 Wis. 656, 9 Am.. Rep. 473 (1871). "Nor
should the court be understood as deciding that the right of a landowner to
obstruct or divert the natural flow of surface water is without limit or qualification by what may be necessary in the reasonable use and improvement of
his own land."
61
52 Supra, note 40.
Another analogy, that of animals ferrae taturae,has been suggested in 1 Stanford L. Rev. 43 (1948). While such an analogy might lend support to a rule
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COMMENTS

CONCLUSION
Considering the property right of every man to the use and
enjoyment of his land, and considering the profound effect which
natural rainfall has upon the realization of this right, it would
appear that the benefits of natural rainfall should come within
the scope of judicial protection, and a duty should be imposed on
adjoining landowners not to interfere therewith. In the foregoing
discussion an attempt has been made to resolve the problem of
when the duty is breached and the right violated. By various analogies the scope of the duty in related fields of law has been
explored, and the conclusion has been reached that the rule of
reasonable user should be applied. What constitutes a reasonable
use presents a much more difficult question; so difficult, in fact,
that the courts, at the present time, might very well declare
•that any use or interference by private individuals for their own
benefit, is unreasonable. One result of an opposite holding would
be to allow private individuals to effectively disrupt property values,
at least in the surrounding areas, and this, with the sanction of the
courts. Considering, however, the economic benefits which might possibly accrue from a constructive program of artificial rainmaling, it may
be necessary to tolerate such activities, but only under some type of
governmental supervision. Whether this supervision should be state or
national presents another question, the answer to which depends more
upon the various legislatures than it does upon the courts.
PAUL BINZAK
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of absolute appropriation, it may be difficult to establish that rain falling upon

one's land has been "reduced to possession" within the meaning of the ferrae
naturae doctrine. Furthermore, rain, by its very nature will appropriate itself
and constitute a benefit to the underlying soil; animals ferrae naturae require
an affirmative act by one or more individuals -before they become of any real
value.

